

Welcome to the Sentinel Review of Officer Involved Shootings in 2022



Presented by the
Mesa Police Department

What is a sentinel review?

A sentinel review is a process that examines an undesirable outcome and aims to reduce the occurrence of similar events from happening again. Sentinel reviews are a form of “forward-looking” accountability that involves multiple stakeholders and a system-based approach. The goal of a sentinel review is to realize the reduction in these events through advances in policy, procedures, and training.

Why did we conduct a sentinel review?

Year	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
OIS	4	9	17	7	5

In Mesa, officer-involved shootings (OIS) average six occurrences per year. However, in 2022, there were 17 such incidents, a substantial increase over the typical annual figure. The Department sought to thoroughly investigate the underlying causes to identify potential policy and training adjustments that could help reduce these incidents.



How did we conduct the sentinel review?

- Engaged **Arizona State University** to conduct an initial [external] review of each of the 17 OISs in 2022. This review provided **considerations** to improve policy and training within the Mesa Police Department.
- Organized **multi-disciplinary teams** of highly experienced members of the **Mesa Police Department** to facilitate an in-depth analysis of each of the 17 OISs in 2022 to render **conclusions** and produce **recommendations** for the Department guided by the considerations from Arizona Status University.
- Solicited **feedback** from a **review committee of 18 community volunteers** over several meetings where the analysis and recommendations were presented by the team leaders.
- Presented the **final recommendations and committee feedback** to the **Chief and his executive level staff** for discussion and approval of the recommendations for the Department to enhance policy and training.

Committee Review Teams



Assistant Chief Lee Rankin		Committee Chairperson	
Geoffrey Balon		Legal Advisor	
Elizabeth Wiltrout		Records Administrator	
Detective Britney Brimhall		13 years	Policy
Mrs. Kristen Lottman		23 years	Crime Analyst
Commander Tim Walker		26 years	Training/IA
Lieutenant Jason King		19 years	Academy Sergeant/SWAT
Sergeant Christen Rope		11 years	SCU Detective
Sergeant Todd Zoglman		21 years	Range Sergeant/Marine Corps/SCU/Gangs
Officer Will Smith		17 years	Lead Rifle instructor. Salt River SWAT
Commander. J.R. Gomez		25 years	Patrol, IA, Investigations, Special Operations, Training
Lieutenant Glenn Bell		22 years	Patrol, SWAT K-9, & Operations Lieutenant
Lieutenant Carlos Santana		12 years	Patrol, Street Crimes, & Training
Sergeant Doug Hurley		20 years	Patrol & Investigations
Sergeant Tyler Hyer		14 years	Patrol & Street Crimes
Commander Mike Bellows		34 years	Special Projects
Lieutenant Efren Carmona		25 years	Patrol & Investigations
Lieutenant Ben Hibbing		19 years	Patrol & Tactical
Sergeant Dave Coffey		16 years	Patrol & Investigations
Sergeant Leo Davila		17 years	Patrol & Tactical
Commander Aaron Spicer		26 years	Investigations & Internal Affairs
Commander Diana Clevenger		20 years	SWAT, Investigations & HR
Lieutenant Matt Harris		19 years	SWAT, Training & Traffic
Sergeant Kevin Bailey		13 years	Patrol & Investigations
Sergeant Greg Love		23 years	Investigations & Internal Affairs
Sergeant Adam Goulet		18 years	Patrol, Training & Peer/Wellness

**We invite you to view exhibits
based on our work.**



The Incident

Police – Citizen
Interaction



The Officers

Communication Tactics
Patience and Restraint
Safety Risk



On Scene

Patrol Rifles
Less Lethal Options
Vehicles



The Suspect

Early Threat Assessment
Risk Assessment



Post Incident

Emergency Medical Care
Critical Incident
Review Board




The Incident

Types of Interactions

Incident Factors




Types of Interactions




Number of calls for service based on type of call

Breakdown by District and Shift



Incidents based on district location and time of day




The Incident


Incident Factors



Stimulus for Officer Firing Duty Weapon




Time from Contact with Subject to Shooting



In 76% of the incidents, officers were confronted with lethal force within 5 minutes of encountering the suspect

Time from Officer Weapons Pointed to Shooting



In 70% of the incidents, officers responded with their duty weapon in less than 1 minute



The Officers

Communication Tactics

Patience and Restraint

Safety Risk



Communication Tactics

ASU Considerations

At times little or no verbal direction was offered before officers resorted to physical hands-on tactics.

Officer commands were confusing and conflicting at times


Officers may not understand how an impaired subject may perceive verbal direction

Shouting & repeating the same commands at an indifferent subject




Analysis

of Officers Issuing Commands Prior to Shooting




*Of the 4 instances where multiple officers issued commands, only 2 (50%) of them had officers issuing at the exact same time.

Did Officer(s) Issue Conflicting Commands Prior to Shooting?



Initial Information or Appearance of Subject Impairment Prior to Shooting



*Impairment includes: alcohol, drugs, mental health, or any combination

Communication Tactics

Recommendations

The following additions to Section 2.3 De-escalation in the Use of Force Policy (DPM 2.1.1) are:

In their interaction with subjects, members should

- Announce themselves to police
- Use firm, clear and simple verbal direction

The utilization of communication skills using appropriate tone and showing empathy, may diffuse conflict and reduce the need to use force. When possible, members should;

- However, there are times when a member will need to announce clear, assertive and professional commands to control the situation

When multiple members are on scene, there should be a concerted effort to have one member issue verbal commands to prevent conflicting directions. Members are encouraged to vary their approach to verbal direction, when possible, especially if repeated commands appear to be ineffective.

Members should consider de-escalation tactics in a manner that avoids unduly jeopardizing their own safety or the safety of others.

By adhering to the responsibilities below, supervisors will uphold the principles of the sanctity of life policy and ensure all officers prioritize the preservation of life and human dignity in their interactions with the public.

- Provide ongoing training in de-escalation techniques and use-of-force protocols.
- Ensure all officers understand the sanctity of life policy.
- Continuously monitor officer conduct for adherence to policy.
- Conduct after-action reviews for incidents involving use of force to assess compliance and identify areas for improvement.
- Regularly review and evaluate reports and documentation of use-of-force incidents.
- Respond to scenes involving use of force to manage the situation and ensure policy adherence, as required by DPM 2.1.1 (Supervisor Responsibilities)
- Ensure necessary medical aid is requested for injured individuals.

The following update to Section 6 Levels of Resistance in the Use of Force Policy (DPM 2.1.1) is:

Non-compliance may be due to a medical condition, mental, physical, or hearing impairment, language barrier, drug interaction, substance impairment, or emotional crisis and have no criminal intent. Similarly, members should be mindful of how environmental factors such as noisiness or the chaotic nature of the scene could impact the subject's decision making. These situations may require a change in tactics that could be more effective while maintaining member safety or to protect the public.

The following in service training is underway:

Human Performance

- Cognitive Training
- Decision-Making and Situational Awareness
- Injury Prevention and Recovery
- Stress Management



Committee Feedback

- The community recommended training not be fear based in order to prevent officers from contacting the public from a position of fear.
- Enhanced training on emotional intelligence.
- Supervisor engagement on calls for service and assignment of roles, command giver, contact person (understanding role of rapport building).
- Enhanced Sanctity of Life training to be embedded in the fabric of who we are not just a policy.
- Human factor overriding training, concerns that hiring and training doesn't identify and remove officers unable to conform to department values.
- Emphasis on supervision, being on scene, engaged and demonstrating courageous leadership

Chief & Executive Staff Decision

Reviewed & Approved August 12, 2024

Patience and Restraint

ASU Considerations


The Mesa Police Department should create incentives for more senior officers to return to the Patrol Division so that more tenured officers are on shift.

Mesa Police Department training should emphasize slowing down situations (when practical) so that de-escalation tactics and communication skills can be used.




Analysis

MPD Patrol Officers Average Years Experience by Year 2014-2024



#/% of Patrol Officers Less Than 5 Yrs Experience



Patience and Restraint

Recommendations

Yearly training review specific to **D**e-escalation, **C**ommunication, **A**nd **T**actics (DCAT)

Review training lesson plans and ensure the equation of **Distance + Cover = Time** are implicitly covered in performance objectives.

Implement the 2025 Patrol Proficiency Program so that non-patrol officers and sergeants spend at least 40 hours in a patrol assignment with assigned squads



Committee Feedback

Balancing Patrol:

- Recommended use of focus groups to see what would entice officers to work weekends.
- The committee offered that schedule flexibility might help; members need flexibility to switch schedules with somebody else when needed.
- It was asked if there is something physically intense or otherwise that makes members not want to do work uniformed patrol.
- Questions asked about attrition, whether we conduct exit interviews, and vocational programs for high school kids interested in law enforcement.
- Community also inquired about whether department requires minimum community engagement hours for officers

ICAT/DCAT

- Committee supportive of incorporating distance + cover = time and communication concepts into lesson plan performance objectives. A committee member remarked that this is very important, and that it's apparent in these incidents that this was not at the forefront of officers' minds

Chief & Executive Staff Decision

Review scheduled November 25, 2024

Critical Decision-Making Model





Training Bulletin



Number 2023-015

Advanced Training Section

September 26, 2023

The Critical Decision Model (CDM) is a tool to assist you systematically think your way through an incident, from the time you start the incident to the end of it.

The Mesa Police Departments Mission and Values provide us a benchmark as we work through CDM.

Mission: Partnering with our community to prevent and reduce crime and to ensure procedural justice by building trust, showing respect, and preserving human rights.

Values: Knowledge, Respect, Integrity.

The Department's highest priority is the sanctity of life. In all aspects of their conduct, members will act with the foremost regard for the preservation of life and the safety of all persons involved, human rights, the dignity of every individual, and the Constitution of the United States and the State of Arizona.

The CDM supports officers making better decisions before and during incidents. It provides a structure to collect information, assess threats and risks, weigh options and quickly implement a decision. Using the CDM can assist officers from rushing to judgment based on faulty or incomplete information. The model never stops working as it requires constant assessment and gathering of information. Courses of action and tactics change rapidly as information is collected or threats change.

Lots of factors surround the issue of making decisions. Many law enforcement decisions are based on what the suspect does or doesn't do. Circumstances of each individual situation should dictate how and why decisions are made and when the best course of action is implemented. Be very flexible in your decision-making process and listen to every piece of information that is made available. The CDM process should and will accelerate if life is in danger. Otherwise slow the process down so more information can be gathered that will lead to a better solution to the problem.

The Training Division's mission is to cultivate a culture of using critical thinking skills and concepts to recognize and proactively deescalate dangerous situations, enhance threat recognition, and selecting the proper response for them. This is accomplished through threat identification training, mitigation response training, and use for force training (including PJI/less lethal options). In the next year you will notice the Training Division will place a noticeable emphasis on critical decision making. We look forward to seeing you attend in-service training.

Mesa Police Training Section

1

Safety Risk

ASU Considerations

Whenever possible, Officers should consider **time, place and location** to effect an arrest. In reviewing the Officer Involved Shootings, did officers determine the best location and tactic to initiate an arrest? What factors should be considered during arrest?

- Several incidents involved citizens or officers in the line of fire either directly or indirectly.
- Violent suspects should not be confronted where citizens are present.
- Difficult to determine whether the officers established a plan to approach the suspect.



Analysis


Categorization of Officer Involved Shootings

Officer Response Call for Service 9 (53%)	Officer Initiated On-View 5 (29%)	Pre-Planned Event Special Operations 3 (18%)
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
GO #	Address	Assignment	CFS Group	Time from Contact to OIS	Time From Weapons Drawn to OIS
2022-1533	3241 E Enrose	Patrol	Dispatched	Less than 1 min	5 seconds or less
2022-1893	625 W McKellips	Patrol	Dispatched	1 to 5 mins	More than 1 minute
2022-3042	2200 W San Angelo	VOU	Pre-Planned	5+ mins	Unknown
2022-27876	302 N Sycamore	Patrol	Dispatched	1 to 5 mins	5 seconds or less
2022-34592	1127 W Main St	Patrol	Dispatched	Less than 1 min	5 seconds or less
2022-40936	9946 E Palm Ln	GANGS	Pre-Planned	5+ mins	Less than 1 min
2022-60399	301 N Ithica	SCU	Offer Initiated	1 to 5 mins	Less than 1 min
2022-98339	1600 S Gilbert Rd	Patrol	Dispatched	Less than 1 min	5 seconds or less
2022-133219	8100 E University Dr	Patrol	Offer Initiated	Less than 1 min	5 seconds or less
2022-138392	444 W Ivyglen	Patrol	Offer Initiated	1 to 5 mins	5 seconds or less
2022-142605	130 N Robson	Patrol	Offer Initiated	Less than 1 min	5 seconds or less
2022-174486	McClintock/Rio Salado	VOU	Pre-Planned	1 to 5 mins	Unknown
2022-176696	1960 W Baseline Rd	SWAT	Dispatched	Less than 1 min	Less than 1 min
2022-177031	550 W 9th St	Patrol	Dispatched	5+ mins	More than 1 minute
2022-200975	Alma School/Main St	Patrol	Dispatched	Less than 1 min	Less than 1 min
2022-251120	537 E Franklin Ave	Patrol	Offer Initiated	Less than 1 min	5 seconds or less
2022-254823	815 S Dobson Rd	Patrol	Dispatched	5+ mins	More than 1 minute

Conclusions

Time from Contact with Subject to Shooting



Were attempts made to evacuate citizens to a safer location?



Safety Risk

Recommendations

Implement new procedures and standardized training for Impaired Driver Blocks, High Risk Traffic Stops, and Vehicle Containment Tactics.

- Natural front blocks and adequate backdrop to prevent suspect vehicle movement or avenue of escape
- Pre-Planned Events – Discuss alternate actions before suspect contact if time permits
- Discuss exit strategies and tactical retreats before contact
- Discuss alternate apprehension options and standardized “Abort” protocols
- Advanced Training addresses weapon and tool manipulation while operating a motor vehicle
- Supervisors must carefully consider the facts of each scene before deploying resources or implementing any use of force



Develop a departmental Immediate Action Team Policy and Training Lesson Plan.

- Members must consider and evaluate the safety of the public, officers, and the individual. Considerations should include but are not limited to:
- Individual's criminal history; resources; personnel; tools
- Whether there are additional persons in or around scene such as elderly persons, small children, or uninvolved persons
- Environmental factors such as time of day and location (proximity to schools/daycares, traffic, increased presence of citizens, populated businesses, etc.)
- Whether other apprehension tactics would be effective
- Any other apprehension tactics that would be reasonable under the circumstances
- Supervisors must carefully consider the facts of each scene before implementing any use of force

Committee Feedback

The Committee was concerned these high-level incidents were often not the first calls for service regarding the subject.

- Is there a way to prevent officer-involved shootings by addressing issues at an earlier stage, which would be more preventative in nature? Perhaps this could be achieved through legislation. It would be advantageous to address lower-level contacts before they escalate to a high-level incident.
- If we had a better system to empower officers in these types of cases, it could help prevent these situations. Officers are limited in what they can do, and we need a more comprehensive social system.
- The Committee believes this could be a significant root cause, and establishing connections between the police department and social legislatures could be beneficial.

The Committee was interested in whether the Department creates a profile of the officer type involved in these critical incidents, including their personalities, histories, and issues.

- The Committee feels this could be a significant root cause, and the police department connecting with social legislatures could be beneficial.

Performing inspections or audits to ensure that protocols are followed could be beneficial.

Chief & Executive Staff Decision

Reviewed & Approved August 12, 2024



On Scene

Patrol Rifles

Less Lethal Options

Vehicles



Patrol Rifles


ASU Considerations

Officers appear to frequently deploy with their rifles as their primary weapon, and not as a cover weapon, or when greater range and/or accuracy is needed as the policy recommends.

Analysis




Officer Experience (yrs) and Type of Firearm Used




62.5% of the officers used handgun, and 37.5% of the officers used a rifle in the OIS.

Initial Information About Armed Subjects and Types of Calls




Initial call comments on the family fight incident did not include information about subject having access to a firearm. As soon as the comments updated, officers deployed with rifles.

Assignments for Rifle Shooters




12 of the 32 officers who fired lethal weapons fired a rifle. 8 of the 12 were assigned to patrol at the time

Patrol Rifle Program by Approx. Years Experience



230 rifle operators in the patrol rifle program. 14 have less than 2-3 years on.

Distance Rifle Fired from Subject



The 1-10ft incident was Gangs during a vehicle containment. One shooting happened as subject was exiting laundry room, the rest were all outdoors.

Conclusions

The Team reviewed the cases and believe current MPD policy regarding rifles was not violated during the OIS's. It was clear to the Team that there is a need for deployment considerations not found in the current policy. Additionally, several other things were identified where improvements could be made to the current policy.

Patrol Rifles

Recommendations

Officers need to have three years as a sworn officer to apply for the Mesa Police Department rifle program. If you are a lateral, you need to have an equivalent of three years sworn and one year at Mesa.

The purpose of deploying the patrol rifle is to enhance officer and public safety. Patrol Rifle Operator may deploy the patrol rifle after consideration of the following factors or at the direction of a supervisor:

- Whether the subject poses an immediate threat of serious physical injury or death to officers or the public;
- Whether the subject is known to or suspected of possessing a firearm or is armed with a dangerous weapon;
- Whether the subject is beyond the effective range of department pistols;
- Whether the subject is known to wear or is suspected of wearing body armor;
- During a High-risk traffic stop, or/and as a cover weapon for immediate action team.
- A perimeter containment option if the situation necessitates its use.

Rifles should not be used to clear small living structures (ie hotel rooms, trailers, studio apartments etc) unless you have exigent circumstances.

The supervisor shall ensure patrol rifles are deployed within policy and additional resources are deployed as needed to resolve the incident.

Committee Feedback

The new changes sounds like a better option, especially the three-year waiting period.

Depending on the situation of the incident / crime there should be a maximum number on how many officers that should be allowed to deploy with their patrol rifle included in this change.

Chief & Executive Staff Decision

Reviewed & Approved August 12, 2024



Less Lethal Options

ASU Considerations

The deployment or lack of having less-lethal weapons is a contributing factor in which an incident results in an officer involved shooting.


- Having every available less-lethal weapon present on scene leads to their use at the first plausible justification.
- The type of less-lethal weapon(s) to be used and who should use them ought to be coordinated between responding officers before arriving on scene.



Analysis


Was there an opportunity available to deploy less lethal prior to OIS?	
No	9
Yes	7
Yes	
Less lethal was used before but on a vehicle. Due to poor tactics it was not an option on a person.	1
Grand Total	17

There was an opportunity to deploy less lethal in 8 of the 17 incidents (47%).



Less lethal was actually utilized in 7 of the 8 cases PRIOR to the OIS.


Types of Less Lethal Options Available On-Scene



Types of less lethal options deployed PRIOR to the OIS

- Bean bag was used in all 7 incidents
- Taser was used in 2 of 7 incidents

Less Lethal Options Used on Objects



Less lethal was used on a vehicle (mirror or window) in 5 incidents

Conclusions

MPD policy and training were followed in accordance with best practice. MPD did have less lethal options on scene and were deployed in accordance with policy and training.

Less Lethal Options

Recommendations

Expand the sergeant’s classroom training to 8 days (from 6) to include more training on leadership, critical incidents, understanding and deployment of less-lethal tools, and additional training in immediate action teams.

Committee Feedback

None

Chief & Executive Staff Decision

Reviewed & Approved September 30, 2024



Less Lethal Options Illustrated

	Chemical Agents	Chemical Agents Optimal range 3-15 feet.
	CEW (Taser)	Optimal range 5-15 feet (up to 25 feet)
	Pepperball Launcher	Optimal range 6-60 feet (direct impact)
	Less Lethal Shotgun	Optimal range 30-45 feet (up to 105 feet)
	40mm Specialty Weapon	Optimal range 15-90 feet (up to 150 Feet)

Effective / Total Deployments in 2023

- CEW (Taser) -172/238. 72%
- Pepper Ball (Direct Impact)- 5/11. 45%
- Pepper Ball (Area saturation)- 22/39. 56%
- Less Lethal Shotgun- 34/55. 61%
- 40mm- 1/2. 50%

Vehicles

ASU Considerations

The justification to shoot at a moving vehicle, while legal in specific circumstances, should be avoided, especially in instances where the suspect is driving away from the officers.

- Language relevant to shooting at motor vehicles should be aligned between all Department policies and outline specifically the circumstances where shooting at a suspect in a vehicle is required.




Analysis

Breakdown of incidents involving vehicles




Weapon Posed by Suspect




10 of the 17 events, officers shot at or from a vehicle

Immediate or Imminent Threat Posed by Suspect




8 incidents, there was an immediate or imminent threat posed by the suspect driving the vehicle

Actions Placing Officer in Unsafe Position




- 2 of the 10 events, officers placed themselves in an unsafe position or path of fleeing vehicle
- 2 of the events were pre-planned apprehensions by Special Operations
- 6 of the 10 events, the suspect's actions placed the officers in an unsafe position or path

10 incidents where officers fired at or from moving vehicles



Intelligence on Armed Status



- 7 incidents, additional intelligence was gathered indicating the suspect was armed
- 4 of 7 had firearms present
 - 3 incident, no intelligence was gathered

Conclusions

Immediate work went into a policy update for shooting at or from moving vehicles.

Less Lethal Shotgun policy was changed to prohibit its use on a vehicle; this was to prevent inadvertent escalation of an incident.

The Department rolled out refresher training on shooting at or from a moving vehicle.

High Risk Vehicle Stop and Impaired Driver Block mandatory training was conducted

Vehicle Containment Techniques policy was developed and published. We were able to standardize protocols and provide thresholds for its use.

Vehicles

Recommendations

Provide annual departmental refresher training on shooting at or from moving vehicles

- Policy
- Training Bulletin
- Departmental Training Video

Create Blue Team Vehicle Node - Track all use of force incidents when a vehicle is involved with these types of force:

- Pepper Spray – Oleoresin Capsicum (OC)
- Impact Weapons
- Taser
- Pepper Ball
- Firearms

Use of Force Incidents involving vehicles: Reviewed by Chain of Command

Can be referred to Advanced Training, Internal Affairs, or Critical Incident Review Board

- Officer(s) placement and tactics
- Corrective Action or Supplemental Training
- Identify potential policy and training issues

Committee Feedback

A committee member asked if our officers are trained in passenger approach to vehicles, and it was explained that we are.

It was asked if VirTra would allow for shooting at or from a moving vehicle training scenarios which could somehow be incorporated into officer training.

- It was explained that yes, VirTra can be used for training scenarios, but it's unknown if they have this scenario.
- MPD is getting a new system.
- We could also come up with some type of structured training where we can have real-life training scenarios that we put officers through.

Chief & Executive Staff Decision

Review scheduled December 2, 2024





The Suspect

Early Threat Assessment
Risk Assessment



Early Threat Assessment


ASU Considerations

Early intervention-that might also require cooperation of mental health professionals, prosecutors, the courts, and family members—can reduce some of the risk of lethal police-suspect encounters.

- Improving procedures for quickly initiating emergency mental health detentions
- Obtaining and executing court authority to search for and impound any lethal weapons to which the person making the threats has ready access
- Notifying the subjects of threats about them and assisting them in enhancing their safety

Analysis

Mental Health Related



Conclusions

Current MPD policy, training, and best practice clearly define the importance of protecting persons affected by mental illness in a crises by providing guidance, techniques, and resources to resolve the situation in a humane manner.

During a review of 2022 OIS's there was only one opportunity for officers to consider early intervention. Officers utilized de-escalation techniques and resources available to them in an effort to protect the person affected by mental illness, the community and themselves to the best of their ability.

Officer's actions were limited by the mentally ill persons refusal to voluntarily accept services, laws related to detention of mentally ill person, and ability to safely detain the mentally ill person when Mental Health Detainer (MHD) was obtained.



Early Threat Assessment

Recommendations

Currently Mental Health Support Team (MHST) officers and clinicians work Monday thru Friday 0600 A.M. to 06:00 P.M. excluding holidays and are not on-call during off hours

- Create on-call status for MHST
- Determine when mental crises are occurring
- Expand MHST hours and days worked
- Increase MHST staffing

MHST currently emphasizes MHD service over patrol critical response needs

- Become more patrol based
- Deprioritize MHD services on inpatient clients and emphasize critical response
- Assist with connecting the dots for those in a mental health crisis as a means of early threat assessment

Increased utilization of Mobile Crisis Response Teams

- Training for patrol
- Monitor usage

Committee Feedback

At what point does the Mesa Police Department have the authority to send a mental health provider out?

If the Mesa Police Department decides not to respond, is there a check and balance on the person that makes that decision

An officer's hands are tied on mental health issues, a subject must be a danger to himself or others. Legislation needs to be changed so the police have better tools for mental health cases.

Chief & Executive Staff Decision

Review scheduled November 18, 2024



Risk Assessment


ASU Considerations

A heavy police response, regardless of the threat assessment (i.e., a non-violent non-interpersonal crime), will overwhelm the subject(s), causes fear and confusion especially involving emotionally disturbed persons or those under the influence of drugs/alcohol.

- A heavy response to the scene was immediate and may not have been necessary.
- Officers may not be reassessing the threat throughout the incident timeline.




Analysis



4 of 5 heavy responses were deemed appropriate.


- Aggravated Assault - Patrol
- Warrant Violent Crime - Gangs
- Warrant Violent Crime - SWAT
- Barricaded Subject - SWAT
- Stolen Vehicle - Patrol



2 of 9 non-violent calls had a heavy response.

- Stolen Vehicle > Endangered officers with vehicle
- Burglary > Armed Barricade

Did Officers Reassess the Threat?



53% of the incidents were reassessed for threats prior to the shooting.

- 8 incidents the shooting occurred during the initial scene assessment
- 9 incidents there was time for reassessment after the initial assessment.

Conclusions

Current MPD policy, training, and best practice clearly define the importance of assessing risk before and during police operations as well as assessing and reassessing the situation throughout the call.

On most calls the officer and resources appear to be assigned appropriately for the call. However, there is one instance where there may have been more resources on scene than needed.

In most cases where there was time for a reassessment of the situation, officers appeared to demonstrate proper escalation and de-escalation through words and/or actions. However, there were a few cases where the reasons for escalation should be reviewed.

Risk Assessment

Recommendations

Focus on the critical decision-making model as the foundation of scenario-based training.

Committee Feedback

Positive Feedback from Committee:

- The Committee was good with the foundations of our training being Ethics, Values, Proportionality, and Sanctity of Human Life.
- The Committee discussed not fully agreeing with ASU's assessment, and felt in some scenarios, there should have been more officers, not less.

Questions/Concerns from Committee:

- It was discussed that in several situations, the police responding on scene were escalators. Committee believed word choice was part of the escalation on some of the incidents.
- The Committee wanted to emphasize the time element. When it comes to assessment, how much are we emphasizing the time element?
- It was discussed whether we can do a better job with vehicle containments. The Committee brought up vehicle placement specifically as it relates to a vehicle being used as a shield.
- It was inquired if there are any more questions 911 call takers could ask to help us address the risk to our officers. Additional information that may be helpful when responding to a scene, example more mental health questions.

Chief & Executive Staff Decision

Reviewed & Approved August 12, 2024



Critical Decision-Making Model





Post Incident

Emergency Medical Care

Critical Incident
Review Board



Emergency Medical Care

ASU Considerations

In several of the incidents we were highly impressed by the speed with which MPD officers began rendering emergency medical care to the person just shot. In a couple of other incidents, the emergency medical response and securing of the suspect's weapon seemed a bit slower than necessary.

- Review tactics and training for coordinated emergency medical care.
- Ensure MPD awards programs recognize life-saving efforts for suspects.



Analysis

Once scene was secured, aid was rendered within approximately 30 seconds except in the following:

GO#	ADDRESS	TYPE OF EVENT (ie: Pre-Planned)	LEVEL OF INJURY	DID SUBJ POTENTIALLY STILL HAVE A WEAPON PRESENT?	AFTER SECURED SCENE HOW QUICKLY WAS AID RENDERED? (In Minutes)	WHAT LEVEL OF MEDICAL CARE WAS PROVIDED/ AVAILABLE BY OFFICER?	WAS FIRE STAGED? (Y/N)
2022-174486	McClintock & Rio Salado (Tempe)	Pre-Planned	Injured	Yes	3:20	Bleeding control, Fire/EMS	N
2022-176696	1960 W Baseline Rd	Dispatched	Injured	Yes	1:00	Tourniquets, med kits, pressure	Y
2022-200975	Alma School & Main St	Dispatched	Injured	Yes	1:00	Fire/EMS	Y
2022-254823	815 S Dobson Rd	Dispatched	Death	Yes (vehicle)	3:00	Fire/EMS	N

Mesa Fire and Medical Department staged in 8 out of 17 cases (pre-panned)
8 cases were either dispatched or officer-initiated calls. MFMD did not stage.
VOU case-moving operation, no staging of MFMD.
Types of Injuries: Death – 7, Injured – 7, Uninjured - 3

Conclusions

Current Use of Force policy: Once the scene is safe and as soon as practical, ensure appropriate medical aid whenever:

- An individual has sustained visible injury, complains of injury or continuing pain, or requests medical attention;
- A subject has been rendered unconscious; and/or
- A conducted energy weapon (CEW), impact weapon, and/or the Carotid Control Technique has/have been deployed on a subject.

Current policy on Lifesaving Medal: A. Awarded to members directly responsible for saving a human life where the recipient was not placed in personal danger.

Emergency Medical Care

Recommendations

No changes to policy

Committee Feedback

Can you imagine the optics you guys are going to face if you give an award for shooting someone then saving them?

I don't support it. I don't think an individual that has caused the injury should receive an award.

The way the policy is written is fine. There are options outside of a Lifesaving Medal that can be used if necessary.

I'd venture to guess most officers involved in OISs would not want a Lifesaving Medal

I'm against this medal. I think there should be some form of recognition, but not a medal. A medal should be seen as something so prestigious. Offering a medal for this would diminish the medal.

Chief & Executive Staff Decision

Review scheduled November 25, 2024



Critical Incident Review Board

ASU Considerations


Redesign the current Critical Incident Review Board (CIRB) so it includes and is led by external experts in police use of force.

Establish a process providing an unbiased expert review of critical incidents.

CIRB reviews should adopt the approach of “but for causation” that are explicitly non-blaming in nature and which emphasize identifying any and all relevant factors contributing to the outcomes of critical incidents, with the aim of making improvements to reduce the risks of future similar outcomes.



Analysis



Critical Incident Review Board (CIRB)
Recommendations
from 17 Mesa PD Officer Involved Shootings in 2022

Conclusions

After a thorough review of the Critical Incident Review Board process and procedures, the committee and review team agreed to adopt updates to the policy that incorporates the considerations proposed by ASU.

Critical Incident Review Board

Recommendations

Increase CIRB Board membership to include:

- Police Commander or Lieutenant from another police agency
- Patrol Operations Lieutenant (Street Crimes Unit Trainer)
- Violent Offender Unit (VOU) member at large

CIRB review to include “but-for” causation or “root cause” analysis

Remove “private session” for CIRB non-voting members

Update Concurrent Investigations Policy (DPM 2.1.11) to add a post-incident training refresher as part of the return-to-work protocol.

- All involved members
- Within 14 days
- May include force-on-force scenarios, Virtra, scene management, etc.
- Any supplemental training documented in member training matrix

CIRB Report to include community comments

Mesa Police Planning and Research Unit compiles monthly and end-of-year trend analysis for MPD Executive Staff



Committee Feedback

It was asked how we select community members to be on CIRB

It was asked how realistic it would be to have this training within 2 weeks

It was asked if there are occasions where officers are resentful of required training.

- It's not unusual for us to send officers to supplemental training when we see deficiencies.
- Officers may feel singled out.
- Our idea is to bring the entire core group out to training as a return-to-work process.

It was asked why community members on the Board must be approved by the City Manager (“biased”). Discussion back and forth in support and opposition

We need to do better at capturing community feedback. Why don't we want input from the person on the street? Maybe revisit how the board is created to engage more of the community.

Chief & Executive Staff Decision

Reviewed & Approved September 30, 2024



Thank You

Thank you for attending
the Sentinel Review
of Officer Involved
Shootings in 2022